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Abstract 
This study explores that whether the debt financing or debt forgiving would be suitable 
for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Debt Laffer curve theory has been 
tested in 21 HIPCs by applying price equation of debt, maximized value of debt and 
price elasticity approach over the period of 1980 to 2016. The maximized value of debt 
criterion implies that Chad is not eligible for the debt write-off strategy in comparison 
with the rest of the countries. By applying price elasticity approach, it is observed that 
only Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, and Republic of Congo are eligible for debt 
financing while the remaining countries should adopt debt write-off facility. The crux 
of the study is that overall debt forgiveness is suitable for the HIPCs. Moreover, it is 
also in the favor of both the creditor countries and various international financial 
institutions such as World Bank and IMF and HIPCs itself. The study suggests that the 
creditors should continue to financing along with improving structural policies and 
institutions of the HIPCs.  
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1. Introduction  
External debt can be observed as a gear to economic growth if managed and implied to targeted 
and weak areas of the economy through proper planning as arrangement of extra resources are 
considered integral to local savings. It could likewise exchange of technology, production and 
management skills which therefore revitalizes economic growth (Mullick, 1988). The reason for 
foreign debt is to expand genuine exchange of assets from the developed countries to the 
developing countries, so that these nations may get economic growth and therefore enhance their 
welfare by investing foreign debt in a proper way. 
Debt Laffer curve is basically a rating tool which is helpful for credit worthiness of 
debtor’s/creditors country. To understand debt Laffer curve, one should understand debt overhang 
first. Debt overhang can be measured as the difference between the present value of a country’s 
contractual debt obligations and the expected resource transfers that are needed to service it 
(Agénor, 2000). Debt overhang situation may properly be explained by supposing a country that 
has debt stock in current period and she has to repay it in future and debtor country’s resources 
that are earned in current period through that debt will be flight away to the creditor countries in 
future as the result of debt servicing of that initial debt. After this, debtor country will get small 
benefit and she has to finance her investments through additional loans and resultantly debt 
servicing obligations accumulate. 
When a country is in debt overhang situation, the creditor’s country has two options for debtor 
country: one is debt forgiveness and second is debt financing. Creditor country has to decide 
whether she should go for debt forgiveness or debt financing. They can finance if they hope that 
debtor country will repay her debt and they can forgive by reducing the debt to that level that 
debtor country can repay it. Debt Laffer curve helps creditor country in taking decision between 
forgiving or financing. If any country lies on the wrong side of debt laffer curve, debt forgiving 
will be suitable both for creditor.  
This study has estimated that which countries are on correct or wrong side of debt Laffer curve to 
point out whether debt forgiveness will be favorable for these countries or not? This study has 
significance because it will help the HIPCs to cope with their excessive debt issues. The study 
would also support the creditors of these countries to make clear cut policies whether they should 
continue to finance or they should give the facility of debt write-off to the HIPCs so that their 
provided debt is managed and used properly. The study is also imperative because it will help to 
boost the economic growth and welfare of the people of HIPCs by adopting the proper external 
debt management policy.  
The rest of the study is arranged as. Section 2 explains the literature on empirical studies on debt 
laffer curve. Section 3 gives theoretical underpinning of debt laffer curve while in section 4 model 
specification is given. Section 5 explains data sources, Results and discussions. In the last section, 
the conclusions and policy implications are presented. 
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2. Review of Empirical Studies 
In this section, we have reviewed the empirical studies based on debt Laffer curve analysis. 
Claessens (1990) supported his results on a pooled cross-sectional regression utilizing the data of 
December 1986, 1987, and 1989 secondary market prices of bank debt for countries. The study 
assumed a linear relationship between the secondary market price of debt (P) and its face value 
(D). Claessens pointed out that only five of the twenty-nine countries were on the wrong side of 
the curve, while two were near the peak. These findings recommend that “across-the-board debt 
forgiveness generally via lessening of the nominal claims outstanding, unfavorable of the creditors 
for most heavily indebted countries. 
Krugman (1998) analyzed the trade-off faced by the creditor countries. When a country is in debt 
overhang situation, creditor’s country has two options for debtor country: debt forgiveness and 
debt financing. Creditor country has to decide whether he should go for debt forgiveness or debt 
financing. They can finance if they hope that debtor country will repay its debt and they can forgive 
by reducing the debt level to one that debtor country can repay it. 
Chaudhary and Anwar (2001) explained the debt Laffer curve approach for South Asian countries 
to observe whether debt reduction was favorable for these countries or not. Two approaches i.e. 
OLS estimates and price elasticity applied by using time series analysis in this study. Data for the 
purpose of analysis were taken from 1970-71 to 1994-95 for all the South Asian countries. The 
results showed that Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and India lie on the correct side of 
debt Laffer curve.  
Pattillio, Poirson and Ricci (2003) utilized the debt Laffer curve analysis to demonstrate the impact 
of debt on growth by distinguishing the top point where debt starts to affect negatively on growth. 
In their paper, they went further into breaking down through what channels external debt 
influences growth. They examined whether debt affects growth generally through factor 
accumulation or productivity. They found that the negative effect of higher debt on growth which 
seem to work both through a solid negative impact on physical capital accumulation and aggregate 
factor productivity growth 
Sundell and Lemdal (2011) explored debt overhang and the effects on developing and developed 
economies. This study investigated association between debt, future payments and investments. 
There were 19 heavily indebted poor countries and 5 indebted poor countries during the two 
different crises of different periods. The findings demonstrated that developing and developed 
nations vary in the impact that debt overhang exerted on investments.  
Sichula (2012) analyzed the presence of debt overhang in South African development community 
and the impact of debt relief on SADC. The study concluded that debt services did not have and 
direct relationship with GDP or private capital and debt overhang was still a paradox while debt 
relief played a major role in GDP growth for these countries. 
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Tatu (2014) assessed the debt Laffer curve for Romania’s case to investigate either it is enduring 
from debt overhang or not. Results showed that Romania does not suffer from debt overhang and 
is on correct side of debt Laffer curve and may possess this position up to coming years. 
After reviewing the literature, it is concluded that there are very few studies that are focused on 
debt Laffer curve especially for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. There is only one study that is 
of Claessens, in which HIPCs are focused but utilizing one technique that is OLS. While Cohen 
has dealt with price elasticity approach and Chaudhary and Anwar have combined both techniques 
i.e. OLS and Price elasticity to estimate the debt Laffer curve for South Asian Countries. For HIPC, 
no study has been conducted to analyze debt laffer curve by using three techniques i.e. and Price 
elasticity so this is research gap and this study is being based on the foundation of this research 
gap. 
To the best of our knowledge there are three researches on debt Laffer curve. Among them one is 
of Claessens (1990) for 29 HIPCs in which Debt Laffer curve is estimated with OLS technique, 
while Cohen (1988) endeavored to find out the Debt Laffer curve problem with price elasticity 
approach for 31 developing countries. The third study is of Chaudhary and Anwar (2001) which 
is for South Asian countries in which both techniques, the Price Elasticity and the OLS have been 
used to estimate the debt Laffer curve. Not a single study exists in which three approaches i.e. 
price equation of debt, maximized value of debt and price elasticity approach are used to estimate 
the debt Laffer curve for Heavily Indebted Poor countries giving the room for further research.  
 
3. Debt Laffer curve: Theoretical Underpinning 
This section comprises of conceptual and theoretical foundations of debt Laffer curve.  Applying 
the Laffer curve to the issue of indebtedness, the relationship between the nominal value of debt 
and market value of debt obligations are considered. To determine the position of the debt holder 
country, there are two plausible options: it can either be on the wrong side or on the correct side 
of the Debt Laffer Curve. If the country is on the wrong side of the Debt Laffer Curve (when 
nominal debt claims diminish, the market value of debt goes up), it would ultimately give benefit 
of creditor; while on the contrary, if the country is on the correct side, debt forgiveness would not 
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Figure 1: Debt Laffer Curve 
 
 
                                                      
Figure 1 outlines the relationship between the nominal value of external debt (EXD) and the 
Secondary market price of the external debt outstanding (SMPED).  When the debt stock is at 
lower level, the creditors assume that all the debt payments would be paid fully and it follows the 
45- degree line up to a specific point here indicated as A. In this case, the value of SMPED would 
be unity.   
Surpassing point A due to a further increment in EXD*, the default risk grows corresponding with 
the possibility of repayment falling beneath unity. Point E denotes the defining moment where 
EXD* (Nominal or contractual value of debt) and the risk of genuine default achieve a level that 
causes SMPED to decrease (Agénor, 2000).  
On the correct hand side of point E, a nation is said to be on the wrong side of the Debt Laffer 
curve with expectations of lower repayments due to additional debt. Potential investors and 
creditors see this as a disincentive and subsequently investments decline intensely. This impact is 
sufficiently solid to guarantee that the market value of debt would increase when the stock of debt 
is decreased. To put it in another way, debt installments will increase when the amount used to 
debt servicing is decreased. For lenders, soothing part of the debt would be favorable as the 
capacity and possibly additionally the willingness of the indebted country to service its debt is 
prone to go up. Debtors then gain through decreased general debt and an encouraged 
creditworthiness and appeal as a reliable debtor that really benefits his or her debt (Woller and 
Phillips, 1996). 
4. Model Specification 
We are doing debt Laffer curve analysis by applying three approaches i.e. price equation of debt, 
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4.1 Price Equation Approach  
Debt Laffer curve demonstrates the connection between nominal and market value of debt. The 
secondary market price of the debt determines the market value of the debt (Cohen, 1989 and 
Claessens, 1990). Market value of debt is further a function of nominal external debt and other 
creditworthiness variables. To make things easier, it is assumed that growth rate of exports is 
exogenous and debt servicing is paid in equal annual installments. It also assumed that interest 
rate is constant during and after the grace period and is payable only after the grace period 
(Chaudhary and Anwar, 2001). There are three steps by which we can find the secondary market 
price of debt. 
Step 1: Equal Annual Installments (EAI) 
Equal Annual Installments on external debt outstanding for HIPC can be calculated through 
equation (1).  
T G
T
(Ai) (EXD) (1+Ai/100)  (1+Gi/100)
100(1+Ai/100)
EAI =                                                                    (1) 
Where: 
Ai = Average interest rate on external debt 
EXD = External debt outstanding 
Gi = Grace period interest rate 
G = Grace period 
T = Repayment period 
Step 2: Present Value of External Debt Outstanding 
In this step, present value of external debt (PVED) using the discount rate (D) can be estimated 




PVED =                (2) 
Step 3: Secondary Market Price of External Debt Outstanding 
Secondary market price of the external debt outstanding can be found by dividing the equation (2) 
by external debt outstanding. This is also called the price equation of debt.  
0 1 2SMPED EXDX GRX   = + + +                 (3) 
Where: 
SMPED = Secondary market price of external debt outstanding 
EXDX = External debt outstanding to exports ratio  
GRX = Exports growth rate  
4.2 Maximum Value Approach  
The second criterion is maximum value based approach. It shows that whether a country is on the 
correct or wrong side of the debt laffer curve. It can be calculated by the product of Secondary 
market price and external debt outstanding:  
MVED = (SMPED*EXD)                                                                                             (4)  
MVED= Maximized value of external debt 
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SMPED= Secondary market price of external debt  
EXD = External debt outstanding 
4.3 Price Elasticity Approach 
Price elasticity approach explains the own price effect of demand for external debt. To find the 
degree of responsiveness of external debt, following equation can be estimated:      
0 1 2LSMPED= LEXTD GRX   + + +                  
(5) 
Where: 
LSMPED = Secondary market price of external debt outstanding (in Log form) 
LEXTD = External debt outstanding to exports ratio (in Log form)  
GRX = Exports growth rate  
The decision of debt writes off strategy is based on marginal price of debt which can be found by 
applying the following formula (Cohen, 1989):   
PEED = (SMPED) (1-tx) (DEXD)                (6)  
Where PEED is the price elasticity of external debt, DEXD is the change in external debt and tx is 
t-statistics.  
According to Cohen:  If PEED > (1- tx)(SE)  then debt write-off is favorable.  
5. Results and Discussions   
The data of the study covers the time period from 1985 to 2014 that have been taken from 
International Debt Statistics (IDS), World Development Indicators (WDI) for 21 out of 35 Heavily 
indebted poor countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, republic 
of Cango, The Gambia, Guinea, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda. Some countries are excluded due to 
data limitations are Afghanistan, Bolivia, Central African Republic Comoros, Democratic republic 
of Cango, Ethopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sao 
Tome & Principe and Zambia.  
In this study, the main focus of the study is to trace out whether the HIPCs can benefit from debt 
write-off or not? For that purpose, Debt Laffer Curve analysis has been carried out. There are three 
methods that have been utilized in the literature for Debt Laffer Curve analysis: i) Price equation 
of debt through OLS ii) Maximum value of debt and iii) Price elasticity Method1. We have used 
both the methods for the Debt Laffer Curve analysis. 
  
5.1 OLS Estimates of Price Equation of External Debt 
Firstly, to estimate the price equation of external debt for 21 heavily indebted poor countries, OLS 
has been applied. Initially, to find secondary market price for debt (SMPD), Equal Annual 
Installments (EAI) have been calculated for HIPCs through equation (1). After that, the present 
                                                            
1 Claessens (1990), Sachs and Huizinga (1987) estimated the Debt Laffer curve with OLS technique while Cohen 
(1989) applied price elasticity method. 
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value of debt outstanding has been calculated from EAI by utilizing equation (2). As the market 
value of external debt is taken in terms of the secondary market price of external debt in this study 
so SMPED is estimated by using equation (3). 
The result of OLS estimates of Secondary market price of external debt equation are displayed in 
Table 1, 2 and 3. Each table consists of seven countries due to space limitations and better 
interpretation of the results. Table 1 shows the findings for Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Chad and Republic of Cango while Table 2 includes, Cote d'lvoire, The Gambia, 
Guinea, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi and Mali and Table 3 represents Mauritania, Niger, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda. The dependent variable in all these 
tables is secondary market price for debt (SMPED) while the explanatory variables include 
External debt outstanding to exports ratio (EXDX) and growth rate of exports (GRX) along with 
autoregressive terms to remove the issue of autocorrelation.  
Turning to Table 1, the first explanatory variable is EXDX which has the negative and significant 
association with SMPED for Benin, Burkina Faso, and Republic of Congo. This means that 1 
percent decrease in nominal debt outstanding increases the market value of debt significantly by 
0.023141 for Benin, 0.028778 for Burkina Faso, 0.029865 in the case for Republic of Congo. 
Whereas EXDX has positive and significant relationship with SMPED for Burundi, Cameroon, 
and Chad which explain that 1 percent increase in nominal debt outstanding increases the market 
value of debt significantly by 0.000863 for Burundi, 0.004172 for Cameroon, and by 0.000184 in 
the case of Chad. 
The second explanatory variable is GRX which is positively and significantly associated with 
SMPED for Benin, Burkina Faso, and Republic of Congo. This represents that 1 percent increase 
in growth rate of exports increases the market value of debt by 0.026021 for Benin, 0.248903 for 
Burkina Faso and 0.474524 for Republic of Congo. Whereas negative association exists between 
GRX and SMPED for Burundi, Cameroon and Chad which means that 1 percent decrease in GRX 
increases the value for SMPED by 0.025991for Burundi, by 0.291343 for Cameroon and by 
0.001692 for Chad. 
 
      Table 1: OLS Estimates of Price Equation of External Debt 
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----- ----- ----- 
0.825108 
(0.0014) 
R2 0.762929 0.630800 0.252928 0.725061 0.217925 0.621627 
D.W 1.696775 1.963810 1.945563 1.944151 2.084495 1.778689 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.000000 0.000055 0.150264 0.000000 0.611380 0.000114 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
  
The results of Table 2 shows that EXDX asserts positive effect on SMPED for Cote d'Ivoire, The 
Gambia, Guinea, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi and Mali. This means that 1 percent increase in 
EXDX increases in SMPED by 0.108662 for Cote d'Ivoire, for The Gambia by 0.010403, by 
0.028919 for Guinea, 0.024613 for Honduras, and by 0.048447 for Madagascar, 0.00412 for 
Malawi, and by 0.028622 for Mali. The other independent variable GRX has the positive and 
significant association with SMPED for Guinea and Honduras. This shows that if there is 1 percent 
increase in growth rate of exports the value for SMPED increases by 0.196692 for Guinea, and by 
0.010176 for Honduras. For Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Madagascar, Malawi and Mali, there is 
negative and significant association between GRX and SMPED. 
     Table 2: OLS Estimates of Price Equation of External Debt 
Dependent Variable: SMPED 
Explanatory 
Variables 





























































R2 0.027196 0.536914 0.677209 0.778540 0.849540 0.227054 0.437758 
D.W 1.702240 2.018134 1.603429 1.926078 1.995222 2.188437 2.031131 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.959485 0.000125 0.000161 0.000000 0.000000 0.728637 0.001342 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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The OLS estimates of price Equation of external debt for Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: OLS Estimates of Price Equation of External Debt 
Dependent Variable: SMPED  
Explanatory 
Variables 















































































----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
R2 0.661600 0.871065 0.580687 0.202773 0.640813 0.850337 0.122046 0.067900 
D.W 1.661940 1.881419 2.592292 1.951031 1.804394 1.979580 2.029640 2.013300 
Prob 
(F-statistic) 
0.000002 0.241245 0.000032 0.147386 0.000004 0.000000 0.419536 0.360750 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
It shows the negative association between EXDX and SMPED for Sierra Leone which shows that 
1 percent decrease in nominal debt outstanding increases the market value of debt significantly for 
Sierra Leone by -0.007796 while there is positive association between EXDX and SMPED for 
Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda that shows that if there is 1 
percent increase in EXDX, then market value for debt increases by 0.012714, 0.078180, 0.002351, 
0.065023, 0.000519, 0.038683 and by 0.056705 for Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo 
and Uganda respectively. The relationship between Growth rate of exports and SMPED shows 
positive and significant association for Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Togo while 
negative association for Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda. 
The results of R square shows that model used in this study are very good in case of Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cameron Republic of Congo, Gambia, and Guinea Honduras Madagascar. Mauritania, 
Nicaragua Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda, while for Burundi, Chad, Malawi, Mali, 
Sierra Leone and Togo, the values of R2 are low. Durbin Watson test shows that problem of 
multicollinearity does not exist in any country.  
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5.2 Estimation of the Maximized Value of External Debt 
In Table 4, maximized value of external debt is calculated to sort out the position of a country on 
debt Laffer curve. To calculate maximized value of debt, nominal value of external debt 
outstanding is multiplied by its secondary market price of external debt for each HIPC as 
mentioned in equation (4). Maximized value for debt is calculated for the current year2 i.e. 2014 
as well as for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010 for the decade wise analysis.  
For this purpose, debt to export ratio of targeted year is compared to the debt to export ratio of that 
year for which the value of external debt is maximized. If the debt to export ratio of targeted year3 
is less than the debt to export ratio correspondent to the value for which external debt is maximized, 
the country will be on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve for that specified year and debt 
write off will not be favorable to that country. But if the debt to export ratio of the targeted year is 
greater than the debt to export ratio of the year for which its value of debt is maximized, the country 
will be on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve for that specified year and the debt write off will 
be favorable to that country.   
The results of the maximum value of external debt reflects that debt to export ratio of Benin in 
2014 is 0.855727 which is less than its debt to export ratio for which its value of debt maximized 
(14.2982187) i.e. 5.925466. Table 4 also indicates the decade wise comparison between the current 
debt to export ratio and debt to export ratio for which external debt for Benin is maximized, 
represents Benin was on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve for the year 1990 while in 2000 
and 2010 Benin was on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve. In the case of Burkina Faso it is 
clear from the Table 4 that it is on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve as its current Debt to 
export ratio in 2014 is 0.611499 which is less than its debt to export ratio for which its value of 
debt maximized MVD (5.64802443) that is 2.701161. Decade wise analysis indicates that Burkina 
Faso was on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve in 1990, while in 2000 it was on the wrong 
side and in 2010 it came up on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve.    
If Burundi is taken into account to check whether it is on the correct side of the debt laffer curve 
or on the wrong side, the results show that Burundi is on the correct side of the debt laffer curve 
as its EXTD value for year 2013 is 1.170302 which is less then it’s value for EXT for which its 
value of debt maximized MVD (0.053774685) i.e. 1.312525. Decade wise analysis indicates that 
Burundi was on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve in year 1990, while remained on correct 
side of the debt Laffer curve in 2000 and in 2010. In the case of Cameroon, it is clear from the 
Table 4 that it is on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve as its Debt to export ratio is 0.435611 
in 2014 which is greater than its debt to export ratio for which its value of debt maximized MVD 
(1.164048749) that is 0.30652. Decade wise analysis indicates that Burkina Faso was on the wrong 
side of the debt Laffer curve in 1990, while during year 2000 and 2010 Burkina Faso remained on 
the correct side of the Debt Laffer curve. 
                                                            
2 Current year: In this analysis 2014 is termed as Current year instead of 2016-17 due to unavailability of the data.  
3 Targeted year: The desired year for which the debt Laffer curve analysis is processed to check whether the country 
is on the correct side of the Debt laffer curve or not.   
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Chad is on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve as its value for EXTD is 25.6939 for year 2014 
that is greater than which is greater than the debt to export ratio for which value of external debt 
for Chad maximized MVD (23.3807289) that is 2. During year 1990 Chad remained on the correct 
side of the debt Laffer curve while during year 2000, and 2010 also Chad remained on the wrong 
side of the debt Laffer curve. Republic of Congo is on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve as 
its value for EXTD for year 2014 is 1.466701 greater than the debt to export ratio for which value 
of external debt for Republic of Congo is maximized (0.32071006) that is 1.098322. Decade wise 
analysis indicates that Republic of Congo was on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve in 1990, 
2000 while on the wrong side in year 2010. 
In the case of Cote d'Ivoire results, it is on the correct side of the debt laffer curve as its Debt to 
export ratio for the year 2014 is 0.65189 which is less than the debt to export ratio for which value 
of external debt for Cote d'Ivoire is maximized (21.6734645) that is 0.830895 Decade wise 
analysis indicates that Burkina Faso was at the wrong side in 1990, while in during years 2000 and 
2010 was at the correct of the debt Laffer curve. The Gambia, at the wrong side of the debt Laffer 
curve as its value for EXTD is 1.54546 for year 2014 that is greater than the debt to export ratio 
for which value of external debt for The Gambia is maximized (0.02372193) that is 1.158978. In 
1990, 2000, and 2010 also The Gambia was on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve.  
Debt to export ratio for Guinea in 2014 is 0.125846 that is less than the debt to export ratio for 
which the value of external debt is maximized 0.06500518 that is 0.543171, results shows that 
Guinea is on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve. Similarly, during 1990, 2000 and for 2010 
also Guinea remained on the correct side of the Laffer curve.  Honduras, at the wrong side of the 
debt Laffer curve as its value for EXTD is 0.630229 for year 2014 that is greater than the debt to 
export ratio for which value of external debt for Honduras is maximized (0.24510314) that is 
0.500914. During years 1990, 2000, and 2010 also Honduras was at the correct side of the debt 
Laffer curve. In the case of Madagascar results in the Table 4 that it is on the correct side of the 
debt laffer curve as its Debt to export ratio for the year 2014 is 0.025583 which is less than the 
debt to export ratio for which value of external debt for Madagascar is maximized (0.01782021) 
that is 0.03125 Decade wise analysis indicates that Madagascar was at the correct side in 1990, 
2000 and in 2010. 
Malawi at the correct side of the debt Laffer curve as the value for EXTD is 0.508751 for year 
2014 that is less than the debt to export ratio for which value of external debt for Malawi is 
maximized (0.09096975) that is 0.651222. During years 1990, 2000, and 2010 also Malawi was 
at the correct side of the debt Laffer curve. Mali is on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve as 
the value for EXTD for year 2014 is 1.008511 greater than the debt to export ratio for which value 
of external debt for Mali is maximized (3.68188609) that is 0.852712. Decade wise analysis 
indicates that Mali was at the correct side of the debt Laffer curve in 1990, 2000 and in 2010 also. 
Mauritania is on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve as the value for EXTD for year 2014 is 
0.608576 greater than the debt to export ratio for which value of external debt for Mauritania is 
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maximized (0.2876522) that is 0.56072. Decade wise analysis indicates that Mauritania remained 
at the correct side of the debt Laffer curve in 1990, 2000 and in 2010. 
Niger, at the correct side of the debt Laffer curve as its value for EXTD is 0.936914 for year 2014 
that is less than the debt to export ratio for which value of external debt for Niger is maximized 
(1.73342536) that is 1.054236. During 1990 Niger was on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve 
while for the year 2000, and 2010 also Niger was on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve.  Debt 
to export ratio for Rwanda in 2014 is 1.339207 that is less than the debt to export ratio for which 
the value of external debt is maximized 0.06500518 that is 0.543171, results shows that Rwanda 
is on the correct side of the debt Laffer curve. Similarly, during 1990, 2000 and for 2010 also 
Rwanda remained on the correct side of the Laffer curve.  
Sierra Leone, at the correct side of the debt Laffer curve as its value for EXTD is 0.18021 for year 
2014 that is less than the debt to export ratio for which value of external debt for Sierra Leone is 
maximized (4.0451E-05) that is 1.100688. During years 1990, 2000, and 2010 also Sierra Leone 
was at the correct side of the debt Laffer curve. In the case of Senegal results in the Table 4 that it 
is on the wrong side of the debt laffer curve as its Debt to export ratio for the year 2014 is 0.881541 
which is greater than the debt to export ratio for which value of external debt for Senegal is 
maximized (0.41729963) that is 0.8207 Decade wise analysis indicates that Senegal was at the 
correct side in 1990 and 2000 while at wrong side in 2010. Tanzania at the wrong side of the debt 
Laffer curve as the value for EXTD is 0.880062 for year 2014 that is greater than the debt to export 
ratio for which value of external debt for Tanzania is maximized (0.64389946) that is 0.849199. 
Decade wise analysis indicates that Tanzania was at the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve in 
1990, at correct side in year 2000 and again at wrong side during 2010. Togo is on the wrong side 
of the debt Laffer curve as the value for EXTD for year 2014 is 0.260712 greater than the debt to 
export ratio for which value of external debt for Togo is maximized (0.05210485) that is 0.249835. 
Decade wise analysis indicates that Togo remained at the correct side of the debt Laffer curve in 
1990, 2000 and in 2010. Uganda is on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve as the value for 
EXTD for year 2014 is 0.800332 greater than the debt to export ratio for which value of external 
debt for Mali is maximized (0.38033692) that is 0.697541. Decade wise analysis indicates that 
Uganda was at the correct side of the debt Laffer curve in 1990, 2000 and in 2010. 
In nutshell, overall position of the HIPCs countries in the debt Laffer curve is estimated through 
comparing the debt to export ratio of the current year with the value of debt to export ratio 
corresponding to its overall maximized value of debt. The results show that Benin, Bolivia, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cote d'lvoire, Gambia, Guinea, Honduras, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo 
and Uganda are on the debt laffer curve. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations                       (Contd. . .) 
 
 
Table 4: Secondary Market Prices of External Debt, Maximized Value of External Debt and External Debt Outstanding to Exports of HIPC (1980-2014) 
(Millions) 
Years 
1.Benin 3. Burkina Faso 4. Burundi 5. Cameroon 7. Chad 8. Republic of Congo 9. Cote d'lvoire 
SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX 
1980 1.00000 14.30 5.93 0.19638 1.27 2.87 0.06949 1.19 33.19 0.16773 12.73 3.62 0.11629 1.17 14.09 0.22483 4.48 27.78 0.16340 44.10 7.41 
1981 0.26894 4.18 3.34 1.00000 5.65 2.70 0.48713 9.58 41.36 0.67777 48.63 3.92 0.11629 0.99 9.70 1.00000 14.77 28.83 1.00000 285.89 9.81 
1982 0.52566 10.04 9.84 0.30026 1.67 3.02 0.96709 22.91 33.26 1.00000 67.57 3.75 0.30001 1.98 10.67 0.47099 8.71 29.88 0.84090 244.35 10.22 
1983 0.10539 2.03 10.25 0.46479 2.77 3.81 1.00000 30.12 35.63 0.68123 42.17 3.37 0.30001 1.97 6.16 0.76651 13.83 30.92 0.94783 249.67 10.38 
1984 0.48327 8.78 6.28 0.54769 3.16 3.29 0.44960 13.07 31.05 0.28099 15.32 2.67 0.23426 1.10 3.17 0.84737 13.92 1.21 0.47661 102.72 7.11 
1985 0.30192 6.85 6.64 0.23005 1.64 4.26 0.17955 6.49 28.18 0.64440 34.50 2.47 0.36706 2.02 5.64 0.59466 14.14 1.94 0.55284 134.21 7.59 
1986 0.34842 9.52 7.13 0.25048 2.39 4.75 0.17294 8.19 33.13 0.50420 35.26 2.71 0.03418 0.28 5.60 0.32421 12.68 4.99 0.36832 108.18 7.88 
1987 0.05859 1.87 6.92 0.32790 3.99 4.23 0.27691 18.32 58.45 0.26417 20.99 3.76 0.07819 0.86 6.03 0.73808 32.82 4.43 0.32488 117.95 10.19 
1988 0.18384 5.63 9.72 0.19568 2.35 3.85 0.13477 8.96 47.78 0.53024 43.84 3.57 0.05750 0.66 5.05 0.47354 21.27 4.76 0.36029 129.04 10.79 
1989 0.05917 1.59 9.15 0.17470 1.70 3.84 0.14384 9.25 54.77 0.46171 43.33 4.00 0.05742 0.67 5.87 0.35508 14.80 3.31 0.38224 153.62 12.41 
1990 0.09079 2.51 7.34 0.24485 2.72 3.03 0.09896 6.13 63.41 0.45777 51.71 4.49 0.11272 1.57 5.09 0.18768 9.19 3.26 0.29424 144.17 13.76 
1991 0.06802 1.92 5.18 0.04705 0.63 3.79 0.12286 7.76 49.27 0.39908 44.90 4.72 0.03962 0.64 6.96 0.00000 0.48 3.95 0.29088 149.16 15.17 
1992 0.08447 2.40 5.30 0.02554 0.37 4.44 0.07917 5.06 58.93 0.17826 22.56 5.31 0.03882 0.75 8.56 0.25374 12.32 3.86 0.29491 154.36 14.48 
1993 0.04605 1.36 5.10 0.09893 1.55 5.02 0.10834 6.67 61.75 0.22365 23.67 5.63 0.04472 0.95 10.44 0.00000 0.53 4.46 0.21431 108.66 15.40 
1994 0.07054 1.68 4.27 0.17210 2.39 4.94 0.07343 4.48 58.90 0.07489 8.79 6.50 0.11797 1.97 8.57 0.06048 2.49 4.00 0.17666 55.81 8.93 
1995 0.08747 1.83 3.28 0.01917 0.28 5.08 0.08715 4.72 38.80 0.08968 11.45 6.22 0.04751 0.78 5.09 0.05816 2.57 3.19 0.05679 17.55 6.83 
1996 0.03483 0.67 2.80 0.07114 1.06 5.32 0.07104 3.28 80.37 0.02849 3.55 4.92 0.03766 0.63 6.96 0.00000 0.33 1.85 0.04343 13.21 5.87 
1997 0.08512 1.62 3.36 0.03577 0.52 5.66 0.06333 2.08 33.92 0.06768 7.92 4.66 0.02461 0.40 8.56 0.00000 0.30 1.69 0.04088 9.36 4.41 
1998 0.06949 1.27 3.12 0.36870 5.62 5.80 0.05561 1.72 42.99 0.01901 2.26 4.83 0.11530 1.89 10.44 0.00000 0.37 2.48 0.01112 2.34 3.90 
1999 0.10121 1.78 2.81 0.04553 0.73 6.04 0.06004 1.66 45.22 0.04397 4.87 5.00 0.03717 0.71 8.57 0.00000 0.28 1.62 0.01392 2.59 3.43 
2000 0.05593 0.90 2.91 0.07830 1.13 5.68 0.14161 2.76 35.14 0.01268 1.34 3.92 0.02415 0.43 11.06 0.11697 2.18 0.70 0.01507 2.52 3.71 
2001 0.01000 0.17 3.07 0.02101 0.31 5.34 0.03400 0.57 35.97 0.04488 4.28 3.32 0.09246 1.46 12.10 0.01100 0.22 0.90 0.00159 0.24 3.19 
2002 0.01549 0.27 2.84 0.07827 1.14 4.71 0.02879 0.53 47.11 0.02034 1.98 3.22 0.02485 0.45 13.15 0.00992 0.23 0.95 0.01413 2.00 2.36 
2003 0.04310 0.68 2.14 0.01215 0.20 4.16 0.01576 0.29 39.33 0.02662 2.87 3.33 0.02452 0.53 14.20 0.01612 0.42 0.92 0.00000 1.40 2.11 
2004 0.00743 0.13 2.10 0.01625 0.29 3.07 0.02884 0.47 24.62 0.02933 2.96 2.58 0.03986 0.84 15.24 0.02847 0.77 0.74 0.02849 4.17 1.86 
2005 0.02828 0.45 1.97 0.03210 0.57 3.06 0.02871 0.37 13.04 0.00000 0.70 1.63 0.08495 1.38 16.29 0.01037 0.22 0.42 0.04461 5.80 1.49 
2006 0.01924 0.12 0.65 0.00000 0.10 1.39 0.00000 0.13 13.64 0.03982 1.19 0.61 0.00000 0.16 17.33 0.02948 0.55 0.30 0.02067 2.83 1.44 
2007 0.02596 0.20 0.54 0.04626 0.60 1.62 0.05815 0.75 13.04 0.01079 0.29 0.42 0.03327 0.54 18.38 0.01698 0.25 0.24 0.16937 24.39 1.47 
2008 0.02404 0.22 0.55 0.03280 0.43 1.22 0.03608 0.37 6.22 0.00588 0.14 0.32 0.01786 0.26 19.42 0.10723 1.31 0.70 0.02455 3.02 1.06 
2009 0.01939 0.23 0.81 0.02228 0.34 1.36 0.02457 0.10 3.44 0.01951 0.51 0.48 0.13899 2.32 20.47 0.00946 0.13 0.90 0.09156 12.30 1.07 
2010 0.00731 0.11 0.85 0.04143 0.69 0.84 0.00602 0.02 2.06 0.00808 0.20 0.44 0.44833 8.14 21.51 0.00900 0.05 0.95 0.04479 4.53 0.79 
2011 0.03010 0.49 0.93 0.09051 1.51 0.57 0.01685 0.05 1.31 0.04949 1.16 0.31 0.10309 1.88 22.56 0.05790 0.32 1.10 0.18821 21.67 0.83 
2012 0.00546 0.09 0.85 0.04874 0.85 0.50 0.01385 0.04 1.28 0.03780 1.04 0.36 0.06666 1.22 23.60 0.00459 0.03 1.22 0.16700 13.73 0.62 
2013 0.03799 0.72 0.86 0.08671 1.51 0.62 0.01395 0.04 1.17 0.02808 0.99 0.43 1.00000 23.38 24.65 0.02056 0.16 1.34 0.06767 6.56 0.73 
2014 0.06359 1.03 0.86 0.07271 1.26 0.61 0.01382 0.04 1.06 0.02485 0.93 0.44 0.01132 0.26 25.69 0.00407 0.04 1.47 0.00979 0.92 0.65 
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Table 4: Secondary Market Prices of External Debt, Maximized Value of External Debt and External Debt Outstanding to Exports of HIPC (1980-
2014)    
(Millions) 
Years 
11. The Gambia 12. Guinea 15. Honduras 17. Madagascar 18. Malawi 19. Mali 20. Mauritania 
SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX 
1980 0.03209 0.80 37.47 0.24994 15.08 16.61 0.16509 30.74 19.24 0.17574 4.75 5.21 0.36005 1122.95 990.92 0.21058 4.55 8.23 0.08784 6.21 26.19 
1981 0.18783 5.91 48.17 1.00000 57.32 14.41 0.67576 134.87 22.10 1.00000 27.62 6.95 1.00000 2651.69 835.05 1.00000 22.28 11.12 0.43455 32.88 22.32 
1982 0.20762 6.71 38.54 0.70886 33.26 13.56 0.70548 145.41 26.31 0.67317 17.35 6.75 0.21020 535.04 946.01 0.58031 12.05 10.91 0.52409 42.46 26.49 
1983 0.18876 6.07 39.25 0.66414 25.13 8.66 0.49935 110.49 27.15 0.61522 13.78 6.26 0.36717 867.07 855.44 0.92616 19.59 10.13 1.00000 84.87 23.92 
1984 0.02571 0.82 27.08 0.50136 15.46 7.14 1.00000 230.32 26.68 0.32416 6.93 5.41 0.48940 1010.50 604.70 0.22570 5.47 10.41 0.28768 22.77 23.96 
1985 1.00000 24.50 28.10 0.24129 9.98 4.67 0.61574 159.84 28.09 0.17153 3.91 6.44 0.13035 286.63 796.32 0.15673 4.63 12.41 0.27338 21.61 19.64 
1986 0.02773 0.53 20.54 0.33562 31.61 16.61 0.45702 123.91 26.46 0.10033 2.38 5.89 0.36281 796.81 807.93 0.27424 9.72 12.79 0.26810 23.72 19.89 
1987 0.01425 0.28 15.63 0.57043 49.57 14.41 0.49031 142.66 30.14 0.12756 3.02 5.48 0.09060 201.33 718.60 0.69940 29.70 12.43 0.12816 11.92 21.17 
1988 0.02682 0.48 12.13 0.19738 15.41 13.56 0.86827 237.70 26.13 0.06820 1.33 4.69 0.12550 211.40 493.21 0.16128 7.05 13.61 0.09610 8.58 18.71 
1989 0.01186 0.19 9.68 0.24416 14.97 8.66 0.90929 236.97 24.01 0.04454 0.72 3.44 0.07180 102.39 460.25 0.16718 7.44 12.62 0.26104 20.75 16.32 
1990 0.00911 0.14 9.35 0.29641 17.71 7.10 0.61755 145.11 22.31 0.01968 0.31 3.24 0.04351 61.96 314.79 0.19109 9.17 10.85 0.20789 17.25 17.49 
1991 0.10871 0.76 3.10 0.40233 20.16 5.91 0.29469 50.15 16.12 0.03031 0.45 3.01 0.10366 142.52 263.67 0.08924 4.79 11.51 0.39179 23.99 13.06 
1992 0.00285 0.02 3.12 0.28008 11.23 5.86 0.21088 37.49 16.12 0.02509 0.32 2.54 0.02299 28.64 286.59 0.46011 27.35 12.64 0.06388 3.53 12.91 
1993 0.00281 0.02 3.01 0.10211 4.37 5.65 0.09509 16.61 14.09 0.01639 0.18 2.13 0.04831 50.19 297.16 0.27080 15.61 12.09 0.09430 4.81 12.00 
1994 0.00291 0.02 3.17 0.06353 2.93 6.83 0.34291 50.25 10.71 0.01807 0.15 1.29 0.07111 64.80 257.43 0.25056 9.61 9.28 0.08511 4.06 11.18 
1995 0.01921 0.13 3.76 0.12570 5.62 6.38 0.08114 9.76 7.21 0.01733 0.11 0.82 0.09290 52.92 120.36 0.20211 7.34 6.76 0.01523 0.75 9.73 
1996 0.00181 0.01 2.97 0.11400 5.10 5.68 0.06512 6.23 4.83 0.00344 0.02 0.62 0.02591 10.00 69.48 0.08610 3.23 6.81 0.09152 4.53 9.66 
1997 0.00252 0.02 2.92 0.02085 1.00 6.38 0.35832 28.83 3.56 0.01210 0.06 0.57 0.00549 1.69 52.03 0.07936 2.96 5.64 0.10633 4.77 9.75 
1998 0.00424 0.03 2.49 0.05902 2.75 5.64 0.02401 1.79 2.99 0.00406 0.02 0.54 0.00486 1.37 48.41 0.17072 6.36 5.67 0.07745 2.81 9.19 
1999 0.00634 0.05 2.63 0.03827 1.55 5.22 0.00985 0.70 3.08 0.00289 0.01 0.49 0.00577 1.32 43.62 0.28877 9.29 4.52 0.00417 0.15 1.42 
2000 0.00765 0.06 2.61 0.05194 1.90 4.82 0.01653 0.91 1.37 0.00244 0.01 0.35 0.00356 0.61 36.65 0.00000 0.30 4.51 0.03743 1.22 2.70 
2001 0.00401 0.03 2.80 0.02363 0.78 3.91 0.00726 0.34 1.15 0.00213 0.01 0.27 0.00208 0.27 27.12 0.02120 0.58 3.06 0.01637 0.49 3.71 
2002 0.00715 0.06 3.41 0.02303 0.80 4.34 0.01392 0.66 1.08 0.00237 0.01 0.25 0.06596 4.54 14.42 0.03126 0.84 2.50 0.03249 0.89 5.28 
2003 0.00320 0.02 5.42 0.02433 0.76 4.12 0.01553 0.71 1.04 0.00171 0.01 0.29 0.00054 0.04 10.77 0.03817 1.27 2.84 0.01709 0.45 3.93 
2004 0.00946 0.06 3.78 0.11078 3.12 3.43 0.00443 0.21 0.91 0.00191 0.00 0.16 0.00096 0.06 11.25 0.07483 2.38 2.56 0.04401 1.03 3.93 
2005 0.00756 0.05 3.39 0.02003 0.43 2.29 0.00463 0.17 0.98 0.00193 0.00 0.13 0.00112 0.06 8.87 0.05667 1.70 2.08 0.08350 1.77 4.21 
2006 0.00036 0.00 3.31 0.03055 0.51 1.53 0.00659 0.18 0.67 0.00162 0.00 0.04 0.00044 0.01 1.55 0.00939 0.14 0.79 0.01263 0.16 3.31 
2007 0.00908 0.06 2.34 0.01337 0.21 1.18 0.00697 0.14 0.42 0.00211 0.00 0.04 0.00085 0.01 1.34 0.08262 1.46 0.88 0.03491 0.45 3.02 
2008 0.00571 0.02 0.99 0.02535 0.33 0.90 0.01949 0.41 0.42 0.00288 0.00 0.04 0.00034 0.00 1.17 0.04001 0.77 0.73 0.03549 0.48 0.66 
2009 0.00179 0.01 1.46 0.01066 0.13 1.06 0.01423 0.30 0.49 0.00204 0.00 0.05 0.00071 0.01 0.95 0.04412 0.93 0.95 0.09460 1.46 0.94 
2010 0.00000 0.04 1.46 0.03898 0.39 0.64 0.01518 0.32 0.43 0.00000 0.01 0.04 0.00020 0.00 0.85 0.02830 0.67 0.94 0.02934 0.45 0.66 
2011 0.00642 0.02 1.16 0.00783 0.07 0.54 0.01007 0.22 0.35 0.02087 0.02 0.03 0.00138 0.01 0.65 0.06651 1.73 0.91 0.02090 0.29 0.44 
2012 0.00271 0.01 1.12 0.00000 0.03 0.13 0.00000 0.24 0.36 0.00063 0.00 0.03 0.00027 0.00 0.70 0.12599 3.68 0.85 0.00086 0.01 0.55 
2013 0.00401 0.01 1.36 0.00477 0.01 0.14 0.00761 0.25 0.50 0.00191 0.00 0.02 0.00000 0.09 0.65 0.05999 2.04 1.01 0.00000 0.17 0.56 
2014 0.00373 0.01 1.55 0.00511 0.01 0.13 0.00297 0.10 0.63 0.00103 0.00 0.03 0.00004 0.00 0.51 0.09252 3.11 1.01 0.00161 0.03 0.61 
Source: Authors’ calculations                        (Contd …) 
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Table 4: Secondary Market Prices of External Debt, Maximized Value of External Debt and External Debt Outstanding to Exports of HIPC (1980-2014)  
(Millions) 
Years 
22. Niger 23. Rwanda 24. Sierra Leone 25. Senegal 26. Tanzania 27. Togo 28. Uganda 
SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX SMPED MVED EXDX 
1980 0.23815 4.88 3.18 0.17701 4.10 11.76 0.683234 12624.18 6693.31 0.23038 8.57 4.48 0.07677 73.17 125.12 0.11287 49.87 5.48 0.11341 1474.21 3930.60 
1981 1.00000 21.92 4.04 0.63667 14.17 11.88 0.009122 193.0359 10393.10 1.00000 38.00 3.79 0.50794 434.32 105.63 0.53823 230.09 5.07 0.83321 7600.16 3330.24 
1982 0.42290 7.85 4.21 0.66756 15.63 14.96 0.046656 895.0316 12963.39 0.46544 17.93 4.26 0.19225 136.63 134.03 0.51474 222.45 4.88 0.08687 1429.94 4742.28 
1983 0.35375 6.11 4.46 0.90977 23.05 16.06 0.004173 67.06229 11308.68 0.41423 16.28 4.04 0.26142 164.31 127.95 0.63219 257.34 5.11 0.16344 2127.20 3539.61 
1984 0.15310 2.34 4.38 0.50507 13.21 14.32 0.000394 4.30507 6287.30 0.38593 14.92 4.22 1.00000 531.90 105.13 0.49540 211.96 4.13 0.04017 444.28 2607.99 
1985 0.15806 3.22 6.44 1.00000 31.52 18.52 0.002892 21.52408 4649.12 0.44043 18.19 4.83 0.09287 56.18 138.55 0.00000 0.00 4.57 0.11809 683.46 1554.15 
1986 0.02659 0.67 5.94 0.42338 17.71 17.66 0.006236 31.84497 3344.81 0.17214 8.49 4.58 0.05142 14.71 64.15 0.29278 0.15 3.92 1.00000 2802.19 664.81 
1987 0.08718 2.46 5.16 0.60824 33.90 31.25 1.000000 2283.695 1247.88 0.17529 10.98 5.67 0.06313 18.24 72.39 0.08042 0.05 4.12 0.01210 16.42 406.65 
1988 0.05259 1.62 6.35 0.53794 31.68 33.70 0.002442 3.36908 880.95 0.08291 5.08 5.27 0.03389 44.62 259.66 0.07063 0.05 3.79 0.00098 0.46 176.15 
1989 0.14799 4.02 6.17 0.67889 36.21 34.04 0.002978 2.67678 504.93 0.07502 3.81 4.03 0.41196 436.53 197.05 0.13905 0.09 3.60 0.06695 16.50 88.72 
1990 0.08922 2.84 5.66 0.59414 31.89 36.44 0.000071 0.04078 273.41 0.10048 5.84 3.78 0.08928 85.21 175.35 0.04742 0.04 3.08 0.00050 0.10 113.88 
1991 0.05749 1.67 6.90 0.21281 11.30 37.39 0.001631 0.43605 118.75 0.25625 14.35 4.05 0.06741 51.19 147.97 0.05438 0.04 3.33 0.00051 0.09 87.81 
1992 0.19061 5.67 6.88 0.29050 15.22 50.29 0.000890 0.14317 78.74 0.10160 5.90 4.03 0.06548 40.33 105.40 0.00000 0.01 3.68 0.00044 0.05 66.09 
1993 0.14848 4.41 8.35 0.13097 6.39 46.45 0.000034 0.00483 79.01 0.07272 4.41 4.91 0.06310 31.70 63.86 0.00000 0.01 5.92 0.00018 0.02 33.24 
1994 0.08108 1.78 8.04 0.12958 5.67 86.83 0.000066 0.00745 52.03 0.14486 6.31 3.36 0.03822 15.63 42.22 0.00000 0.01 4.51 0.00005 0.01 19.20 
1995 0.00911 0.20 6.62 0.32194 10.07 31.65 0.000027 0.00180 52.41 0.03397 1.46 2.70 0.07390 24.30 25.35 0.21106 0.15 3.55 0.00004 0.00 14.79 
1996 0.02083 0.42 5.22 0.05560 1.59 32.13 0.000018 0.00096 46.95 0.06624 2.64 2.75 0.02160 5.93 19.30 0.13833 0.09 2.67 0.00003 0.00 12.19 
1997 0.02466 0.49 6.24 0.01028 0.27 17.24 0.000015 0.00072 99.71 0.05282 2.07 2.92 0.01265 2.79 17.06 0.00000 0.01 2.61 0.00003 0.00 12.70 
1998 0.00244 0.05 5.36 0.00000 0.28 23.40 0.000079 0.00342 75.23 0.10238 4.21 2.80 0.02198 4.02 14.90 0.00000 0.01 2.63 0.00003 0.00 12.74 
1999 0.02655 0.54 6.10 0.01634 0.55 27.80 0.000000 0.37056 106.43 0.01602 0.64 2.63 0.00851 1.48 13.95 0.17799 0.13 2.94 0.00002 0.00 11.81 
2000 0.00333 0.07 5.88 0.03083 0.98 22.54 0.000007 0.00022 54.22 0.00622 0.22 2.59 0.00532 0.78 10.40 0.00000 0.01 3.17 0.00004 0.00 10.60 
2001 0.01432 0.26 5.23 0.02230 0.71 18.37 0.000039 0.00076 23.11 0.01889 0.67 2.42 0.00381 0.48 6.93 0.11871 0.08 2.90 0.00002 0.00 10.72 
2002 0.03141 0.62 5.63 0.02168 0.81 28.72 0.000009 0.00020 19.84 0.04334 1.65 2.40 0.00238 0.31 6.57 0.05627 0.04 2.59 0.00002 0.00 11.71 
2003 0.00912 0.21 5.26 0.10250 3.36 22.52 0.000004 0.00009 12.82 0.02993 1.21 2.12 0.00349 0.43 5.41 0.00000 0.01 2.33 0.00002 0.00 10.42 
2004 0.02521 0.53 3.79 0.02556 0.80 15.09 0.000005 0.00011 9.89 0.01638 0.59 1.58 0.00312 0.42 4.99 0.00000 0.01 2.19 0.00006 0.00 6.95 
2005 0.01216 0.24 3.27 0.03782 0.96 9.76 0.000006 0.00011 7.48 0.02721 0.94 1.35 0.00764 0.79 3.40 0.04028 0.03 1.72 0.00001 0.00 4.83 
2006 0.00488 0.04 1.21 0.06267 0.41 1.66 0.000006 0.00008 4.75 0.01256 0.21 0.65 0.00210 0.09 1.23 0.00000 0.01 1.78 0.00002 0.00 1.19 
2007 0.03789 0.40 1.30 0.22964 1.90 1.70 0.000007 0.00004 1.38 0.06654 1.40 0.69 0.00077 0.04 1.20 1.00000 0.83 1.73 0.00002 0.00 1.01 
2008 0.00000 0.09 0.76 0.17324 1.42 1.13 0.000004 0.00002 1.55 0.10007 2.18 0.57 0.00139 0.07 0.91 0.00000 0.01 1.01 0.00001 0.00 1.06 
2009 0.01208 0.13 0.89 0.08983 0.85 1.55 0.000005 0.00003 1.78 0.01834 0.53 0.88 0.00082 0.05 1.13 0.00000 0.01 1.00 0.00003 0.00 0.91 
2010 0.01319 0.17 0.95 0.01751 0.17 1.52 0.000003 0.00002 1.47 0.00695 0.21 0.87 0.00009 0.01 0.99 0.07235 0.08 0.67 0.00000 0.00 0.85 
2011 0.05269 0.92 1.22 0.01232 0.15 1.30 0.000007 0.00004 1.10 0.00987 0.31 0.78 0.00000 0.64 0.85 0.00000 0.01 0.20 0.00003 0.00 0.72 
2012 0.00424 0.07 1.04 0.01415 0.17 1.16 0.000002 0.00001 0.43 0.01176 0.42 0.82 0.00036 0.02 0.77 0.00000 0.01 0.24 0.00002 0.00 0.59 
2013 0.09036 1.73 1.05 0.00727 0.11 1.25 0.000002 0.00001 0.30 0.00122 0.05 0.84 0.00006 0.00 0.82 0.04047 0.05 0.25 0.00001 0.00 0.70 
2014 0.04442 0.84 0.94 0.04455 0.78 1.34 0.000002 0.00001 0.18 0.00000 0.41 0.88 0.00489 0.37 0.88 0.03402 0.04 0.26 0.00002 0.38 0.80 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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5.3 Debt Laffer curve for HIPCs 
This section provides the estimates of Debt to export ratio at which the overall market value of 
debt is maximized EXDX* and Debt to export ratio for the current year (2014) EXDX for Heavily 
indebted poor countries. Table 5 elaborates that only Chad is on the correct side of the debt Laffer 
curve and is not eligible for debt write-off whereas Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote 
d'Ivoire, republic of Cango, The Gambia, Guinea, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda are on the wrong 
side of the debt laffer curve hence it is beneficial for the creditors to forgive debt.  
 
Figure 2: The Debt Laffer Curve for HIPCs 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
These results are also explained thorough the debt Laffer curve Figure 2. The 45-degree line 
divides the countries in two parts. The countries which are on the declining part of the debt laffer 
curve are on the wrong side while those countries which lies above the 45-degree line, are on the 
correct side of the debt laffer curve.  Based on these results, the bottom line of this section is that 
the overall debt forgiveness is suitable for the heavily indebted poor countries as it will be in the 
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Table 5: Estimates of Debt to Export Ratios for HIPCs 
Country MVD EXDX EXDX* Log(EXDX) Standardized 
Value 
Conclusion 
Benin 14.29821872 0.855727 5.925466 1.779259 0.100519 Wrong side 
Burkina Faso 5.64802443 0.611499 2.701161 0.993682 0 Wrong side 
Burundi 30.1206608 1.170302 35.5328 3.570456 0.329714 Wrong side 
Cameroon 67.5681426 0.43561 3.753667 1.322733 0.042104 Wrong side 
Chad 23.3807289 25.6939 24.64858 3.204719 0.282916 Correct side 
Cango 32.8220419 1.466701 4.427531 1.487842 0.063231 Wrong side 
Cote d'lvoire 285.892135 0.65189 9.806348 2.28303 0.16498 Wrong side 
The Gambia 24.5046878 1.54546 28.09558 3.335612 0.299664 Wrong side 
Guinea 57.3201879 0.125846 14.41422 2.668215 0.214267 Wrong side 
Honduras 237.702323 0.630229 26.12761 3.262993 0.290372 Wrong side 
Madagascar 27.6248038 0.025583 6.950462 1.938808 0.120935 Wrong side 
Malawi 2651.69345 0.508751 835.0541 6.727497 0.733676 Wrong side 
Mali 29.6958822 1.008511 12.43342 2.520388 0.195351 Wrong side 
Mauritania 84.8665845 0.608576 23.92347 3.17486 0.279095 Wrong side 
Niger 21.9159456 0.936914 4.038554 1.395887 0.051465 Wrong side 
Rwanda 36.2058909 1.339207 34.04276 3.527617 0.324232 Wrong side 
Sierra Leone 12624.1877 0.18021 6693.312 8.808864 1 Wrong side 
Senegal 37.9996013 0.881541 3.791748 1.332827 0.043396 Wrong side 
Tanzania 531.904183 0.880062 105.1313 4.65521 0.468515 Wrong side 
Togo 257.338183 0.260712 5.106037 1.630424 0.081475 Wrong side 
Uganda 7600.16182 0.800332 3330.236 8.110798 0.910678 Wrong side 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
5.4 The Price Elasticity Approach  
The next approach is the price elasticity approach to check Cohen favorability condition of debt 
write-off. To find the degree of responsiveness of external debt, equation (5) is estimated:      
i. Price Elasticity Equation of External Debt 
The results of the price elasticity equation of external debt are given in Table 6, 7 and 8. Table 6 
exhibits the negative and significant association between log of external debt outstanding to 
exports (LEXTD) and log of secondary market price of external debt (LSMPED) for Burkina Faso, 
Chad, and Republic of Congo. This means that 1 percent increase in nominal debt outstanding 
decreases the market value of debt by 0.063526 percent for Burkina Faso, 0.074995 percent for 
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  Table 6: OLS Estimates of Price Elasticity Equation of External Debt 


























































R2 0.510713 0.551484 0.411142 0.780073 0.201719 0.561069 
D.W 2.043507 1.518612 1.974742 1.492621 2.070302 1.730788 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.000191 0.000505 0.031994 0.000000 0.651135 0.000575 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
While for remaining countries there is positive and significant relationship between LEXTD and 
LSMPED as 1 percent increase in nominal debt outstanding increases the market value of debt 
significantly by 0.876516 percent for Benin, 0.346176 percent for Burundi, 0.197804 percent for 
Cameroon, by 4.949800 percent in the case of Cote d'Ivoire, for Gambia by 1.013554 percent, by 
0.743096 percent for Guinea, 1.070229 percent for Honduras,  and  by 0.797628, 0.109916, 
0.717656 , 0.835239, 1.893065 , 0.199163, 0.901615, 1.329133, 1.001291, 0.613207 and 
0.960362 percent for Madagascar Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Senegal Tanzania, Togo and Uganda respectively.  
 
 Table 7: OLS Estimates of Price Elasticity Equation of External Debt 
Dependent Variable: SMPED 
Explanatory 
Variables 
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--- --- --- --- 
R2 0.955074 0.556879 0.688479 0.864506 0.837752 0.686210 0.366118 
D.W 1.811021 2.065243 2.303791 1.847697 2.282757 1.899874 2.002869 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.313175 0.000068 0.000116 0.000000 0.000000 0.058876 0.006958 
   Source: Authors’ calculations  
 
The relationship between LEXTD and LSMPED shows negative and significant association for 
Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Uganda 
while positive and significant relationship for Benin, Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Gambia, 
Guinea, Honduras, Malawi, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Togo. The results of R 
square show that the model used in this study are very fit for Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameron 
Republic of Congo, Gambia, Guinea Honduras, and Madagascar. Mauritania, Nicaragua Rwanda, 
Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda while for Burundi, Chad, Malawi, Mali, Sierra Leone and Togo, 
Models are not fit and Durbin Watson test shows that problem of multicollinearity does not exist 
in any country.  
 
Table 8: OLS Estimates of Price Elasticity Equation of External Debt 
Dependent Variable: LSMPED  
Explanatory 
Variables 




















































































---- ---- ---- ---- ----  
R2 0.602708 0.710456 0.731756 0.760152 0.665920 0.753374 0.120145 0.681141 
D.W 1.954708 1.679180 1.747745 2.004489 1.474841 1.920926 1.980124 1.785057 
Prob(F-
statistic) 




Source: Authors’ calculations 
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ii. Cohen Condition Analysis  
Continuing the same approach, now we check whether the debt write-off is favorable to a country 
or not for HIPC countries. First of all, marginal price of debt is calculated and then price elasticity 
of external debt outstanding is measured. Results are presented in Table 9. 







t-Statistic 1 – tx (1 – tx)SE Debt Write Off 
1 Benin 0.88 0.30 2.95 -1.95 -0.58 Favorable 
2 Burkina Faso -0.06 0.53 -0.12 1.12 0.59 Not Favorable 
3 Burundi 0.35 0.12 2.90 -1.90 -0.23 Favorable 
4 Cameroon 0.20 0.44 0.45 0.55 0.24 Not Favorable 
5 Chad -0.07 1.39 -0.05 1.05 1.47 Not Favorable 
6 Congo -0.15 0.65 -0.23 1.23 0.80 Not Favorable 
7 Cote d'lvoire 4.95 2.02 2.45 -1.45 -2.93 Favorable 
8 The Gambia 1.01 0.17 6.05 -5.05 -0.85 Favorable 
9 Guinea 0.74 0.17 4.28 -3.28 -0.57 Favorable 
10 Honduras 1.07 0.13 8.25 -7.25 -0.94 Favorable 
11 Madagascar 0.80 0.19 4.16 -3.16 -0.61 Favorable 
12 Malawi 0.11 0.17 0.65 0.35 0.06 Favorable 
13 Mali 0.72 0.30 2.41 -1.41 -0.42 Favorable 
14 Mauritania 0.84 0.15 5.60 -4.60 -0.69 Favorable 
15 Niger 1.89 2.91 0.65 0.35 1.02 Favorable 
16 Rwanda 0.20 0.38 0.52 0.48 0.18 Favorable 
17 Sierra Leone 0.90 0.23 3.85 -2.85 -0.67 Favorable 
18 Senegal 1.33 0.51 2.63 -1.63 -0.82 Favorable 
19 Tanzania 1.00 0.27 3.76 -2.76 -0.73 Favorable 
20 Togo 0.61 0.47 1.31 -0.31 -0.14 Favorable 
21 Uganda 0.96 0.30 3.18 -2.18 -0.66 Favorable 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
The results of Table 9 suggest that debt write off is favorable to the countries namely Benin, 
Burundi Cote d'lvoire, Gambia, Guinea, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda as Cohen condition is satisfied. So 
far as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad and Republic of Congo are concerned, Cohen condition is 
not satisfied. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The main purpose of this study was to explore which of the policy is suitable for HIPCs i.e. debt 
write-off (debt forgiveness) or debt financing. The study is based on debt Laffer curve analysis of 
HIPCs. Out of 35 HIPCs, 21 countries are included for the analysis. We have calculated the price 
equation of debt by using the secondary market price of the external debt. The study has found 
mixed results of price equation of debt.  The maximum value criterion shows that all HIPCs are 
on the wrong side of the debt laffer curve except Chad suggesting the creditors that debt write-off 
Effect of Debt Overhang on the Development of Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries: Debt Laffer Curve Analysis 
Revista Publicando, 5 No 17. 2018, 77-99. ISSN 1390-9304 
98 
 
strategy is favorable for them.  In the last part of the study, we have also calculated Cohen 
condition. The results show that debt write-off is favorable for the creditors of all the HIPC except 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad and Republic of Congo.  
Based on the findings of the study, following policies are recommendations for HIPCs. 
• It is recommended that debt financing is only suitable for Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, 
and Republic of Cango. 
• Debt write-off strategy is suggested for Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, Cote d'lvoire, Gambia, 
Guinea, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda. 
• HIPCs need to strengthen their debt management programs to condense their debt 
vulnerabilities decisively. 
• Countries should focus on macroeconomic stability and pay attention on their social 
structural programs and reforms like PRSP (poverty reductions support programs) 
supported by Worlds financial institutions like World Bank and IMF etc. 
• HIPCs must invest significant part of their external debt on growth oriented policies such 
as export-growth etc. such like manufacturing, assembling, apparels etc. 
• International Financial institutions and donor’s countries for HIPCs should cooperate and 
finance the Research and development departments especially of agricultural, Information 
technology, so that they may able to better handle new bio-technologies to advance 




Boboye, L., & Ojo, M. (2012). Effect of external debt on economic growth and development of 
Nigeria. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(12). 
 
Chaudhary, M. A., & Awar, S. (2001). Debt Laffer Curve for South Asian Countries. The Pakistan 
Development Review, 40(4), pp-705. 
 
Chaudhary, M. A., Anwar, S., & Tahir, P. (2000). Foreign Debt, Dependency, and Economic 
Growth in South Asia [with Comments]. The Pakistan Development Review, 551-570. 
 
Claessens, S. (1990). The debt laffer curve: Some estimates. World Development, 18(12), 1671-
1677.  
 
Claessens, Stijn, and Ishac Diwan (1989). Market-Based Debt Reduction. Dealing with the Debt 
Crisis. Washington, D. C. (World Bank Discussion Papers.) 
 
Effect of Debt Overhang on the Development of Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries: Debt Laffer Curve Analysis 
Revista Publicando, 5 No 17. 2018, 77-99. ISSN 1390-9304 
99 
 
Cohen, D. (1989). How to cope with a debt overhang: Cut flows rather than stocks. Dealing with 
the debt crisis. Washington, D.C. 
 
Krugman, P. (1988). Financing vs. forgiving a debt overhang. Journal of development 
Economics, 29(3), 253-268. 
Pattillo, C., Poirson, H., Ricci, L., Kraay, A., & Rigobon, R. (2003, January). Through What 
Channels Does External Debt Affect Growth? In Brookings Trade Forum, 229-277). 
 
Pattillo, C., Poirson, H., Ricci, L. (2002). External Debt and Growth. Working Paper, 02(69). 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey (1989). Efficient Debt Reduction. Dealing with the Debt Crisis. Washington, D.C. 
(World Bank Discussion Papers.) 
 
Sachs. J., and H. Hizinga (1987). U. S. Commercial Banks and the Developing Countries Debt 
Crisis, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 2, 55-606. 
 
Sichula, M. (2012). Debt overhang and economic growth in HIPC countries: The case of Southern 
African development community (SADC). International Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 4(10), 82. 
 
Sundell, F., Lemdal, M. (2011). Debt Overhang and the Effects on Developing and Developed 
Economies, Stockholm School of Economics Department of Economics. 
 
Tatu, Ş. (2014). An application of debt Laffer curve: Empirical evidence for Romania's 
case. Romanian Journal of Fiscal Policy (RJFP), 5(1), 29-38. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
